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Abstract. An increasing amount of information today is generated, exchanged, and stored
digitally. This also includes long-lived and highly sensitive information (e.g., electronic health
records, governmental documents) whose integrity and confidentiality must be protected
over decades or even centuries. While there is a vast amount of cryptography-based data
protection schemes, only few are designed for long-term protection. Recently, Braun et al.
(AsiaCCS’17) proposed the first long-term protection scheme that provides renewable in-
tegrity protection and information-theoretic confidentiality protection. However, computa-
tion and storage costs of their scheme increase significantly with the number of stored data
items. As a result, their scheme appears suitable only for protecting databases with a small
number of relatively large data items, but unsuitable for databases that hold a large number
of relatively small data items (e.g., medical record databases).
In this work, we present a solution for efficient long-term integrity and confidentiality pro-
tection of large datasets consisting of relatively small data items. First, we construct a re-
newable vector commitment scheme that is information-theoretically hiding under selective
decommitment. We then combine this scheme with renewable timestamps and information-
theoretically secure secret sharing. The resulting solution requires only a single timestamp
for protecting a dataset while the state of the art requires a number of timestamps linear in
the number of data items. We implemented our solution and measured its performance in a
scenario where 12 000 data items are aggregated, stored, protected, and verified over a time
span of 100 years. Our measurements show that our new solution completes this evaluation
scenario an order of magnitude faster than the state of the art.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation and problem statement
Today, huge amounts of information are generated, exchanged, and stored digitally and these
amounts will further grow in the future. Much of this data contains sensitive information (e.g.,
electronic health records, governmental documents, enterprise documents) and requires protection
of integrity and confidentiality. Integrity protection means that illegitimate and accidental changes
of data can be discovered. Confidentiality protection means that only authorized parties can access
the data. Depending on the use case, protection may be required for several decades or even
centuries. Databases that require protection are often complex and consist of a large number of
relatively small data items that require continuous confidentiality protection and whose integrity
must be verifiable independent from the other data items.
Today, integrity of digitally stored information is most commonly ensured using digital sig-
natures (e.g., RSA [21]) and confidentiality is ensured using encryption (e.g., AES [19]). The
commonly used schemes are secure under certain computational assumptions. For example, they
require that computing the prime factors of a large integer is infeasible. However, as computing
technology and cryptanalysis advances over time, computational assumptions made today are likely
to break at some point in the future (e.g., RSA will become insecure once quantum computers are
available [24]). Consequently, computationally secure cryptographic schemes have a limited lifetime
and are insufficient to provide long-term security.
Several approaches have been developed to mitigate long-term security risks. Bayer et al. [1]
proposed a technique for prolonging the validity of a digital signature by using digital timestamps.
Based on their idea, a variety of long-term integrity protection schemes have been developed.
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An overview of existing long-term integrity schemes is given by Vigil et al. in [25]. In contrast
to integrity protection, confidentiality protection cannot be prolonged. There is no protection
against an adversary that stores ciphertexts today, waits until the encryption is weakened, and
then breaks the encryption and obtains the plaintexts. Thus, if long-term confidentiality protection
is required, then strong confidentiality protection must be applied from the start. A very strong
form of protection can be achieved by using information theoretically secure schemes, which are
invulnerable to computational attacks. For example, key exchange can be realized using quantum
key distribution [10], encryption can be realized using one-time pad encryption [23], and data
storage can be realized using proactive secret sharing [14]. An overview of information theoretically
secure solutions for long-term confidentiality protection is given by Braun et al. [4].
Recently, Braun et al. proposed LINCOS [3], which is the first long-term secure storage archi-
tecture that combines long-term integrity with long-term confidentiality protection. While their
system achieves high protection guarantees, it is only designed for storing and protecting a single
large data object, but not databases that consist of a large number of small data items. One ap-
proach to store and protect large databases with LINCOS is to run an instance of LINCOS for each
data item in parallel. However, with this construction the amount of work scales linearly with the
number of stored data items. Especially, if the database consists of a large number of relatively
small data items, this introduces a large communication and computation overhead.
1.2 Contribution
In this paper we propose an efficient solution to storing and protecting large and complex datasets
over long periods of time. Concretely, we present the long-term secure storage architecture ELSA
that uses renewable vector commitments in combination with renewable timestamps and proactive
secret sharing to achieve this.
Our first contribution (Section 3) is to construct an extractable-binding and statistically hiding
vector commitment scheme. Such a scheme allows for committing to a large number of data items
by a single short commitment. The extractable binding property of the scheme enables renewable
integrity protection [6] while the statistical hiding property ensures information theoretic confi-
dentiality. Our construction is based on statistically hiding commitments and hash trees [18]. We
prove that our construction is extractable binding given that the employed commitment scheme
and hash function are extractable binding. Furthermore, we prove that our construction is sta-
tistically hiding under selective opening, which guarantees that by opening the commitments to
some of the data items no information about unopened data items is leaked. The construction of
extractable-binding and statistically hiding vector commitments may be of independent interest,
for example, in the context of zero knowledge protocols [9].
Our second contribution (Section 4) is the construction of the long-term secure storage ar-
chitecture ELSA, which uses our new vector commitment scheme construction to achieve efficient
protection of large datasets. While protecting a dataset with LINCOS requires the generation of a
commitment and a timestamp for each data item separately, ELSA requires only a single vector
commitment and a single timestamp to protect the same dataset. Hence, the number of timestamps
is decreased from linear in the number of data items to constant and this drastically reduces the
communication and computation complexity of the solution. Moreover, as the vector commitment
scheme is hiding under selective decommitment, the integrity of stored data items can still be
verified individually without revealing information about unopened data items. ELSA uses a sep-
arate service for storing commitments and timestamps, which allows for renewing the timestamp
protection without access to the stored confidential data. The decommitments are stored together
with the data items at a set of shareholders using proactive secret sharing. We show that the
long-term integrity security of ELSA can be reduced to the unforgeability security of the employed
timestamp schemes and the binding security of the employed commitment schemes within their
usage period. Long-term confidentiality security is based on the statistical hiding security of the
employed commitment and secret sharing schemes.
Finally, we experimentally demonstrate (Section 5) the performance improvements achieved
by ELSA in a scenario where 12 000 data items of size 10 kB are aggregated, stored, protected,
retrieved, and verified during a timespan of 100 years. For this, we implemented ELSA and the
state of the art long-term secure storage architecture LINCOS. Our measurements show that ELSA
completes the evaluation scenario 17x faster than LINCOS and integrity protection consumes 101x
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less memory. In particular, protection renewal is significantly faster with ELSA. Renewing the
timestamps for approximately 12 000 data items takes 21.89 min with LINCOS and only 0.34 s with
ELSA. Furthermore, storage of the timestamps and commitments consumes 1.75 GB of storage space
with LINCOS and only 17.27 MB with ELSA at the end of the experiment. These improvements are
achieved at slightly higher storage costs for the shareholders. Each shareholder consumes 559 MB
with LINCOS and 748 MB with ELSA. The storage costs for integrity protection are independent
of the size of the data items. Storage, retrieval, and verification of a data item takes less than a
second. Overall, our evaluation shows that ELSA provides practical performance and is suitable
for storing and protecting large and complex databases that consist of relatively small data items
over long periods of time (e.g., health record or governmental document databases).
1.3 Related work
Our notion of vector commitments is reminiscent of the one proposed by Catalano and Fiore [7].
However, they do not consider the hiding property and therefore do not analyze hiding under
selective opening security. Also, they do not consider extractable binding security. Hofheinz [15]
studied the notion of selective decommitment and showed that schemes can be constructed that
are statistically hiding under selective decommitment. However, they do not consider constructions
of vector commitments where a short commitment is given for a set of messages. In [2], Bitansky
et al. propose the construction of a SNARK from extractable collision-resistant hash functions in
combination with Merkle trees. While their construction is similar to the extractable-binding vector
commitment scheme proposed in Section 3.2, our construction relies on a weaker property (i.e.,
extractable-binding hash functions) and our security analysis provides concrete security estimates.
Weinert et al. [26] recently proposed a long-term integrity protection scheme that also uses hash
trees to reduce the number of timestamps. However, their scheme does not support confidentiality
protection, lacks a formal security analysis, and is less efficient than our construction. Only few
work has been done with respect to combining long-term integrity with long-term confidentiality
protection. The first storage architecture providing these two properties and most efficient to date is
LINCOS [3]. Recently, another long-term secure storage architecture has been proposed by Geihs et
al. [8] that provides access pattern hiding security in addition to integrity and confidentiality. On a
high level, this is achieved by combining LINCOS with an information theoretically secure ORAM.
While access pattern hiding security is an interesting property in certain scenarios where meta
information about the stored data is known, it is achieved at the cost of additional computation
and communication and it is out of the scope of this work.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Notation
For a probabilistic algorithm A and input x, we write A(x) →r y to denote that A on input x
produces y using random coins r. For a vector V = (v1, . . . , vn), n ∈ N, and set I ⊆ [n], define
VI := (vi)i∈I , and for i ∈ [n], define Vi := vi. For a pair of random variables (A,B), we define the
statistical distance of A and B as ∆(A,B) :=
∑
x |PrA(x)− PrB(x)|.
2.2 Cryptographic primitives
We describe the cryptographic primitives that will be relevant for the understanding of this paper.
Digital Signature Schemes A digital signature scheme SIG is defined by a tuple (M,Setup,Sign,
Verify), where M is the message space, and Setup, Sign, Verify are algorithms with the following
properties.
Setup→ (sk, pk): This algorithm generates a secret signing key sk and a public verification key
pk.
Sign(sk,m)→ s: This algorithm gets as input a secret key sk and a message m ∈ M. It outputs
a signature s.
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Verify(pk,m, s)→ b: This algorithm gets as input a public key pk, a message m, and a signature
s. It outputs b = 1, if the signature is valid, and 0, if it is invalid.
A signature scheme is -secure [11] if for any t-bounded algorithm A,
Pr
[
Verify(pk,m, s) = 1 ∧m 6∈ Q :
Setup→ (sk, pk),AO(pk)→ (m, s)
]
≤ (t),
where O(m) = {Q += m; Sign(sk,m)→ s; return s; }.
Timestamp schemes A timestamp scheme involves a client and a timestamp service. The times-
tamp service initializes itself using algorithm Setup. The client uses protocol Stamp to request a
timestamp from the timestamp service. Furthermore, there exists an algorithm Verify that allows
anybody to verify the validity of a message-timestamp-tuple.
Timestamp schemes can be realized in different ways (e.g., based on hash functions or digital
signature schemes [12]). Here, we only consider timestamp schemes based on digital signatures.
This works as follows. On initialization, the timestamp service chooses a signature scheme SIG and
runs the setup algorithm SIG.Setup → (sk, pk). It publishes the public key pk. A client obtains a
timestamp for a message m, as follows. First, it sends the message to the timestamp service. Then,
the timestamp service reads the current time t and creates a signature on m and t by running
SIG.Sign(sk, [m, t])→ s. It then sends the signature s and the time t back to the client. Anybody
can verify the validity of a timestamp (t, s) for a message m by checking SIG.Verify(pk, [m, t], s) = 1.
Such a signature-based timestamp scheme is considered secure as long as the signature scheme is
secure.
Commitment schemes A (non-internactive) commitment scheme COM is defined by a tuple
(M,Setup,Commit,Verify), whereM is the message space, and Setup, Commit, Verify are algorithms
with the following properties.
Setup→ pk: This algorithm generates a public commitment key pk.
Commit(pk,m)→ (c, d): This algorithm gets as input a public key pk and a message m ∈ M. It
outputs a commitment c and a decommitment d.
Verify(pk,m, c, d)→ b: This algorithm gets as input a public key pk, a message m, a commitment
c, and a decommitment d. It outputs b = 1, if the decommitment is valid, and 0, if it is invalid.
A commitment scheme is considered secure if it is hiding and binding. There exist different fla-
vors of defining binding security. Here, we are interested in extractable binding commitments as this
enables renewable and long-term secure commitments [6]. A commitment scheme is -extractable-
binding-secure if for any t1-bounded algorithm A1, there exists an tE -bounded algorithm E , such
that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2,
Pr
Verify(pk,m, c, d) = 1 ∧m 6= m∗ :Setup→ pk,A1(pk)→r c,
E(pk, r)→ m∗,A2(k, r)→ (m, d)
 ≤ (t1, tE , t2).
For any public key k and message m, define Ck(m) as the random variable that takes the value
of c when sampling Commit(k,m) → (c, d). A commitment scheme is -statistically-hiding if for
any k ∈ Setup, any pair of messages (m1,m2), ∆(Ck(m1), Ck(m2)) ≤ .
Keyed hash functions A keyed hash function is a tuple of algorithms (K,H) with the following
properties. K is a probabilistic algorithm that generates a key k. H is a deterministic algorithm
that on input a key k and a message x ∈ {0, 1}∗ outputs a short fixed length hash y ∈ {0, 1}l, for
some l ∈ N. We say a keyed hash function (K,F ) is -extractable-binding if for any t1-bounded
algorithm A1, there exists a tE -bounded algorithm E , such that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2,
Pr
K→k
[
H(k, x) = H(k, x∗) ∧ x 6= x∗ :
A1(k)→r y, E(k, r)→ x∗,A2(k, r)→ x
]
≤ (t1, tE , t2).
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Secret sharing schemes A secret sharing scheme allows a data owner to share a secret data object
among a set of shareholders such that only specified subsets of the shareholders can reconstruct
the secret, while all the other subsets of the shareholders have no information about the secret.
In this work, we consider threshold secret sharing schemes [22], for which there exists a threshold
parameter t (chosen by the data owner) such that any set of t shareholders can reconstruct the
secret, but any set of less than t shareholders has no information about the secret. A secret sharing
scheme has a protocol Setup for generating the sharing parameters, a protocol Share for sharing a
data object, and a protocol Reconstruct for reconstructing a data object from a given set of shares. In
addition to standard secret sharing schemes, proactive secret sharing schemes additionally provide
a protocol Reshare for protection against so called mobile adversaries [14]. The protocol Reshare is
an interactive protocol between the shareholders after which all the stored shares are refreshed so
that they no longer can be combined with the old shares for reconstruction. This protects against
adversaries who gradually corrupt an increasing number of shareholders over the course of time.
3 Statistically hiding and extractable binding vector commitments
In this section, we define statistically hiding and extractable binding vector commitments, describe
a construction, and prove the construction secure. This construction is the basis for our performance
improvements that we achieve with our new storage architecture presented in Section 4.
3.1 Definition
A vector commitment scheme allows to commit to a vector of messages [m1, . . . ,mn]. It is ex-
tractable binding, if the message vector can be extracted from the commitment and the state of
the committer and it is hiding under partial opening if an adversary cannot infer any valuable
information about unopened messages, even if some of the committed messages have been opened.
Our vector commitments are reminiscent of the vector commitments introduced by Catalano and
Fiore [7]. However, neither do they require their commitments to be extractable binding nor do
they consider their hiding property.
Definition 1 (Vector commitment scheme). A vector commitment scheme is a tuple (L,M,
Setup,Commit,Open,Verify), where L ∈ N is the maximum vector length, M is the message space,
and Setup, Commit, Open, and Verify are algorithms with the following properties.
Setup()→ k: This algorithm generates a public key k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): On input key k and message vector [m1, . . . ,mn] ∈Mn, where
n ∈ [L], this algorithm generates a commitment c and a vector decommitment D.
Open(k,D, i)→ d: On input key k, vector decommitment D, and index i, this algorithm outputs a
decommitment d for the i-th message corresponding to D.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i)→ b: On input key k, message m, commitment c, decommitment d, and an index
i, this algorithm outputs b = 1, if d is a valid decommitment from position i of c to m, and
otherwise outputs b = 0.
A vector commitment scheme is correct, if a decommitment produced by Commit and Open
will always verify for the corresponding commitment and message.
Definition 2 (Correctness). A vector commitment scheme (L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify)
is correct if for all n ∈ [L], M ∈Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n],
Pr
[
Verify(k,Mi, c, d) = 1 :
Commit(k,M)→ (c,D),Open(k,D, i)→ d
]
= 1 .
A vector commitment scheme is statistically hiding under selective opening, if the distribution
of commitments and openings does not depend on the unopened messages.
Definition 3 (Statistically hiding (under selective opening)). Let S = (L,M,Setup,Commit,
Open,Verify) be a vector commitment scheme. For n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup,
we denote by CDk(M, I) the random variable (c, D¯I), where (c,D) ← Commit(k,M) and D¯ ←
(Open(D, i))i∈[n]. Let  ∈ [0, 1]. We say S is -statistically-hiding, if for all n ∈ N, I ⊆ [n],
M1,M2 ∈Mn with (M1)I = (M2)I , k ∈ Setup,
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) ≤  .
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A vector commitment scheme is extractable binding, if for every efficient committer, there exists
an efficient extractor, such that for any efficient decommitter, if the committer gives a commitment
that can be opened by a decommitter, then the extractor can already extract the corresponding
messages from the committer at the time of the commitment.
Definition 4 (Extractable binding). Let  : N3 → [0, 1]. We say a vector commitment scheme
(L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify) is -extractable-binding, if for all t1-bounded algorithms A1,
tE -bounded algorithms E, and t2-bounded algorithms A2,
Pr
 Verify(p,m, c, d, i) = 1 ∧mi 6= m :Setup()→ k,A1(k)→r c,
E(k, r)→ [m1,m2, . . .],A2(k, r)→ (m, c, d, i)
 ≤ (t1, tE , t2) .
3.2 Construction: extractable binding
In the following, we show that the Merkle hash tree construction [18] can be casted into a vector
commitment scheme and that this construction is extractable binding if the used hash function is
extractable binding.
Construction 1 Let (K,H) denote a keyed hash function and let L ∈ N. The following is a
description of the hash tree scheme by Merkle cast into the definition of vector commitments.
Setup()→ k: Run K → k and output k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): Set l ← min{i ∈ N : n ≤ 2i}. For i ∈ {0, . . . , n − 1}, com-
pute H(k,mi) → hi,l, and for i ∈ {n, . . . , 2l − 1}, set hi,l ← ⊥. For i ∈ {l − 1, . . . , 0},
j ∈ {0, . . . , 2i − 1}, compute H(k, [hi−1,2j , hi−1,2j+1]). Compute H(k, [l, h0,0]) → c. Set D ←
[hi,j ]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1}, and output (c,D).
Open(k,D, i∗)→ d: Let D → [hi,j ]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1}. Set al ← i∗. For j ∈ {l, . . . , 1}, set bj ←
aj + 2(aj mod 2)− 1, gj ← hj,bj , and aj−1 ← baj/2c. Set d = [g1, . . . , gl] and output d.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i∗)→ b∗: Let d = [g1, . . . , gl]. Set al ← i∗ and compute H(k,m) → hl. For i ∈
{l, . . . , 1}, if ai mod 2 = 0, set bi ← [hi, gi], and if ai mod 2 = 1, set bi ← [gi, hi], and then
compute H(k, bi)→ hi−1 and set ai−1 ← bai/2c. Compute H(k, [l, h0])→ c′. Set b∗ ← (c = c′).
Output b∗.
Theorem 1. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 1 is correct.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 1). Let (L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify) be the scheme described in
Construction 1. Furthermore, let n ∈ [L], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n], Commit(k,M) →
(c,D), Open(k,D, i) → d, and Verify(k,Mi, c, d) → b. By the definition of algorithms Commit
and Open, we observe that d = [g1, . . . , gl] are the siblings of the nodes in the hash tree D =
[hi,j ]i∈{0,...,l},j∈{0,...,2i−1} on the path from leaf H(k,Mi) to the root h0,0. We observe that algo-
rithm Verify recomputes this path starting with H(k,Mi). Thus, h0 = h0,0 = c. It follows that
b = 1. uunionsq
Theorem 2. Let (K,H) be an -extractable-binding hash function. The vector commitment scheme
described in Construction 1 instantiated with (K,H) is ′-extractable-binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) =
2L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 2). Let (K,H) be an -extractable-binding keyed hash function and let
(L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify) be the vector commitment scheme described in Construction 1
instantiated with (K,H). To prove the theorem, we use the extractable-binding property of (K,H)
to construct an extractor for the vector commitment scheme.
Fix t1, tE , t2 ∈ N and t1-bounded algorithmA1. We observe that, because (K,H) is -extractable-
binding, for any t-bounded algorithm A, there exists a tE -bounded algorithm EHA such that for any
t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A(k)→r h, A2(k, r)→ m, and EHA (k, r)→ m′, we have
H(k,m) = h and m 6= m′ with probability at most (t, tE , t2).
Define A0,0 as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes EHA1(k, r) → [l, h0,0], and
outputs h0,0. Recursively, define Ai,j as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes
EHAi−1,bj/2c(k, r)→ [h0, h1], and outputs hj mod 2.
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Now define the vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input (k, r), first compute EHA1(k, r)→r′
[l, h0,0]. Then, for i ∈ {0, . . . , 2l − 1}, sample ri and compute EHAl,i(k, [r, r′, ri]) → mi+1. Output
[m1, . . . ,m2l ].
We observe that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A1(k) →r c, A2(k, r) →
(m, d, i), and E(k, r)→M , the probability of having Verify(k,m, c, d, i) = 1 and Mi 6= m is upper-
bounded by the probability that at least one of the node extraction algorithms relied on by E fails.
As there are at most 2L nodes in the tree, this probability is upper-bounded by 2L∗ (max{t1, tE},
tE , t2).
It follows that Construction 1 is ′-extractable-binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) = 2L∗(t1+tE/L, tE/L, t2).
3.3 Construction: extractable binding and statistically hiding
We now combine a statistically hiding and extractable binding commitment scheme with the vector
commitment scheme from Construction 1 to obtain a statistically hiding (under selective opening)
and extractable binding vector commitment scheme. The idea is to first commit with the statisti-
cally hiding scheme to each message separately and then produce a vector commitment to these
individually generated commitments.
Construction 2 Let COM be a commitment scheme and VC be a vector commitment scheme.
Setup()→ k: Run COM.Setup()→ k1, VC.Setup()→ k2, set k ← (k1, k2), and output k.
Commit(k, [m1, . . . ,mn])→ (c,D): Let k → (k1, k2). For i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, compute COM.Commit(k1,
mi) → (ci, di). Then compute VC.Commit(k2, [c1, . . . , cn]) → (c,D′), set D ← ([(c1, d1), . . . ,
(cn, dn)], D
′), and output (c,D).
Open(k,D, i)→ d: Let k → (k1, k2) and D → ([(c1, d1), . . . , (cn, dn)], D′). Compute VC.Open(k2,
D′, i)→ d′, set d← (ci, di, d′), and output d.
Verify(k,m, c, d, i)→ b: Let k → (k1, k2) and d→ (c′, d′, d′′). Compute COM.Verify(k1,m, c′, d′)→
b1 and then compute VC.Verify(k2, c
′, c, d′′, i)→ b2, set b← (b1 ∧ b2), and output b.
Theorem 3. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 2 is correct if COM and
VC are correct.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 3). Let (L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify) be the scheme described in
Construction 2. Let n ∈ [L], M ∈Mn, k ∈ Setup, i ∈ [n], Commit(k,M)→ (c,D), Open(k,D, i)→
d, and Verify(k,Mi, c, d)→ b. We observe thatD = ((ci, di)i∈[n], D′) and furthermore d ∈ VC.Open(k2,
D′, i). By the correctness of COM, it follows that COM.Verify(k1,Mi, ci, di) = 1, and by the cor-
rectness of VC, it follows that HT.VC(k2, ci, c, d, i) = 1. Thus, Verify(k,Mi, c, d, i) = 1.
Theorem 4. The vector commitment scheme described in Construction 2 is L-statistically-hiding
(under selective opening) if the commitment scheme COM is -statistically-hiding.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 4). Let (L,M,Setup,Commit,Open,Verify) be the scheme described in
Construction 2. For any n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n], M ∈ Mn, k ∈ Setup, and event A ⊆ Ω(CDk(M, I)),
denote by PrM (A) the probability that A is observed when sampling from CDk(M, I).
Let n ∈ [L], I ⊆ [n], M1,M2 ∈ Mn with (M1)I = (M2)I , k ∈ Setup. By the definition of the
statistical distance, we have
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) =
∑
c,D¯I
∣∣∣∣PrM1(c, D¯I)− PrM2(c, D¯I)
∣∣∣∣ .
We observe that for any M = (m1, . . . ,mn) ∈ Mn, algorithm Commit(k,M) → (c,D) first com-
putes Com(k1,mi) → (ci, di), for each i ∈ [n], and then computes HT.Tree(k2, [c1, . . . , cn]) → T .
Denote C˜ = (ci)i∈[n] and D˜ = (di)i∈[n]. By the law of total probability we have
Pr
M
(c, D¯I) =
∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) ∗ Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) .
Furthermore, we observe that c and T are determined by (k, C˜). We also observe that on input
k, D = (T, (ci, di)i∈[n]), and i ∈ [n], algorithm Open computes HT.Path(k2, T, i)→ P and outputs
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d = (ci, di, P ). Hence, the output d is determined by (k, T, i, ci, di). Hence, PrM (c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) > 0
implies PrM (c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) = 1. It follows that∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(c, D¯I |C˜, D˜I) ∗ Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) =
∑
C˜,D˜I :
c,D¯I
Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) .
Next, we observe from the description of algorithm Commit that each call Com(Mi) → (ci, di) is
independent of the other calls Com(Mj)→ (cj , dj), j 6= i. Thus,
Pr
M
(C˜, D˜I) = Pr
M
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M
(ci) .
By the description of algorithms Commit and Open, we have that (C˜I , D˜I) is determined by MI .
We observe that (M1)I = (M2)I . Thus,
Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) = Pr
M2
(C˜I , D˜I) .
It follows that ∣∣∣∣∣∣PrM1(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M1
(ci)
− Pr
M2
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
= Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∣∣∣∣∣∣
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M1
(ci)
−
 ∏
i∈[n]\I
Pr
M2
(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
≤ Pr
M1
(C˜I , D˜I) ∗
∑
i∈[n]\I
∣∣∣∣PrM1(ci)− PrM2(ci)
∣∣∣∣ .
We observe that because Com is -statistically-hiding, we have that |PrM1(ci)− PrM2(ci)| ≤ . It
follows that ∑
i∈[n]\I
∣∣∣∣PrM1(ci)− PrM2(ci)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ L .
In summary, we obtain
∆(CDk(M1, I),CDk(M2, I)) ≤ L .
Theorem 5. If COM and VC of Construction 2 are -extractable-binding, Construction 2 is an
′-extractable-binding vector commitment scheme with ′(t1, tE , t2) = L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 5). Let t1, tE , t2 ∈ N and fix any t1-bounded algorithm A1 that on input
k outputs c.
We observe that because VC is -extractable-binding that there exists a tE -bounded extraction
algorithm E0 such that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment Setup→ k, A1(k)→r c,
A2(k, r) → (ci, d, i), and E0(k, r) → C, we have VC.Verify(k2, ci, c, d, i) = 1 and Ci 6= ci with
probability at most (t1, tE , t2).
Define Ai as an algorithm that on input k, samples r, computes E0(k, r)→ C, and outputs Ci.
For i > 0, define Ei as a tE -bounded extraction algorithm such that for any t2-bounded al-
gorithm A2, for experiment K → k, Ai(k) →r ci, Ei(k, r) → m′i, A2(k, r) → (mi, di), we have
COM.Verify(k1,mi, ci, di) = 1 and mi 6= m′i with probability at most (tE , tE , t2).
Now we define a message vector extraction algorithm E as follows. On input (k, r), first compute
E1(k, r)→r′ C. Then, for i ∈ [|C|], compute Ei(k, [r, r′])→ mi. Output [m1, . . . ,m|C|].
We observe that for any t2-bounded algorithm A2, for experiment A1(k) →r c, A2(k, r) →
(m, d, i), and E(k, r) → M , we have Verify(k,m, c, d, i) = 1 and Mi 6= m with probability at most
L ∗ (t1 + tE , tE , t2).
It follows that the vector commitment scheme described in Construction 2 is ′-extractable-
binding with ′(t1, tE , t2) = L ∗ (t1 + tE/L, tE/L, t2).
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4 ELSA: Efficient Long-Term Secure Storage Architecture
Now we present ELSA, a long-term secure storage architecture that efficiently protects large
datasets. It provides long-term integrity and long-term confidentiality protection of the stored
data. ELSA uses statistically-hiding and extractable-binding vector commitments (as described in
Section 3) in combination with timestamps to achieve renewable and privacy preserving integrity
protection. The confidential data is stored using proactive secret sharing to guarantee confiden-
tiality protection secure against computational attacks. The data owner communicates with two
subsystems (Figure 1), where one is responsible for data storage with confidentiality protection
and the other one is responsible for integrity protection. The evidence service is responsible for
integrity protection updates and the secret share holders are responsible for storing the data and
maintaining confidentiality protection. The evidence service also communicates with a timestamp
service that is used in the process of evidence generation.
Data owner ShareholdersEvidence
Service
Timestamp
Service
Secret Shares
Commitments,
Timestamps
Fig. 1. Overview of the components of ELSA.
4.1 Construction
We now describe the storage architecture ELSA in terms of the algorithms Init, Store, RenewTs,
RenewCom, RenewShares, and Verify. Algorithm Init initializes the architecture, Store allows to
store new files, RenewTs renews the protection if the timestamp scheme security is weakened,
RenewCom renews the protection if the commitment scheme security is weakened, RenewShares
renews the shares to protect against a mobile adversary who collects multiple shares over time,
and Verify verifies the integrity of a retrieved file.
We use the following notation. When we write SH.Store(name, dat) we mean that the data owner
shares the data dat among the shareholders using protocol SHARE.Share associated with identifier
name. If the shared data dat is larger then the size of the message space of the secret sharing
scheme, dat is first split into chunks that fit into the message space and then the chunks are shared
individually. Each shareholder maintains a database that describes which shares belong to which
data item name. When we write SH.Retrieve(name), we mean that the data owner retrieves the
shares associated identifier name from the shareholders and reconstructs the data using protocol
SHARE.Reconstruct.
Initialization The data owner uses algorithm ELSA.Init (Algorithm 1) to initialize the storage
system. The algorithm gets as input a proactive secret sharing scheme SHARE, a set of shareholder
addresses (shURLi)i∈[N ], a sharing threshold T , and an evidence service address esURL. It then
initializes the storage module SH by running protocol SHARE.Setup and the evidence service module
ES by setting ES.evidence as an empty table and ES.renewLists as an empty list.
Algorithm 1: ELSA.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T, esURL)
SH.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T );
ES.Init(esURL);
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Data storage The client uses algorithm ELSA.Store (Algorithm 2) to store a set of data files
[filei]i∈[n], which works as follows. First a signature scheme SIG, a vector commitment scheme VC,
and a timestamp scheme TS are chosen. Here, we assume that SIG is supplied with the secret
key necessary for signature generation and VC is supplied with the public parameters necessary
for commitment generation. The algorithm first signs each of the data objects individually. The
algorithm then stores the file data, the public key certificate of the signature scheme instance, and
the generated signature at the secret sharing storage system. Afterwards, the algorithm generates
a vector commitment (c,D) to the file data vector and the signatures. For each file, the corre-
sponding decommitment is extracted and stored at the shareholders. The file names filenames,
the commitment scheme instance VC, the commitment c, and the chosen timestamp scheme in-
stance TS are sent to the evidence service. We remark that signing each data object individually
potentially allows for having a different signer for each data object. If the data objects are to be
signed by the same user, an alternative is to sign the commitment instead of the data objects.
When the evidence service receives (filenames,VC, c,TS), it does the following in algorithm
AddCom (Algorithm 3). It first timestamps the commitment (VC, c) and thereby obtains a times-
tamp ts. Then, it starts a new evidence list l = [(VC, c,TS, ts)] and assigns this list with all the
file names in filenames. Also, it adds l to the list renewLists, which contains the lists that are
updated on a timestamp renewal.
Algorithm 2: ELSA.Store([filei]i∈[n],SIG,VC,TS)
filenames← {};
for i ∈ [n] do
SIG.Sign(filei.dat)→ si;
SH.Store([’data’, filei.name], [filei.dat, SIG.Cert, si]);
filenames += filei.name;
VC.Commit([filei.dat, SIG.Cert, si]i∈[n])→ (c,D);
for i ∈ [n] do
VC.Open(D, i)→ d;
SH.Store([’decom’, filei.name, i], d);
ES.AddCom(filenames,VC, c,TS);
Algorithm 3: ES.AddCom(filenames,VC, c,TS)
TS.Stamp((VC, c))→ ts;
l← [(VC, c,TS, ts)];
for name ∈ filenames do
evidence[name]← l;
renewLists += l;
Timestamp renewal Algorithm ES.RenewTs (Algorithm 4) is performed by the evidence service
regularly in order to protect against the weakening of the currently used timestamp scheme. The
algorithm gets as input a vector commitment scheme instance VC′ and a timestamp scheme instance
TS. It first creates a vector commitment (c′, D′) for the list of renewal items renewLists. Here,
we only require the extractable-binding property of VC′, while the hiding property is not required
as all of the data stored at the evidence service is independent of the secret data due to the use of
unconditionally hiding commitments by the data owner. For each updated list item i, the freshly
generated timestamp, commitment, and extracted decommitment are added to the corresponding
evidence list renewLists[i].
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Algorithm 4: ES.RenewTs(VC′,TS)
VC′.Commit(renewLists)→ (c′, D′);
TS.Stamp((VC′, c′))→ ts;
for i ∈ [|renewLists|] do
VC′.Open(D′, i)→ d′;
renewLists[i] += (VC′, c′, d′,TS, ts);
Commitment renewal The data owner runs algorithm ELSA.RenewCom (Algorithm 5) to protect
against a weakening of the currently used commitment scheme. It chooses a new commitment
scheme instance VC and a new timestamp scheme instance TS and proceeds as follows. First the
table of evidence lists ES.evidence are retrieved from the evidence service and complemented
with the decommitment values stored at the shareholders. Next, a list with the data items, the
signatures, and the current evidence for each data item is constructed. This list is then committed
using the vector commitment scheme VC. The decommitments are extracted and stored at the
shareholders, and the commitment is added to the evidence at the evidence service using algorithm
ES.AddComRenew.
Algorithm 5: ELSA.RenewCom(VC,TS)
comIndices← {}; comCount← {}; L← [];
for name ∈ ES.evidence do
SH.Retrieve([’data’, name])→ (dat,SIG, s);
ES.evidence[name]→ e;
for i ∈ |e| do
if ei.VC 6= ⊥ then
SH.Retrieve([’decom’, name, i])→ ei.d;
L += (dat,SIG, s, e);
comIndices[name]← |L|;
comCount[name]← |e|;
VC.Commit(L)→ (c,D);
for name ∈ ES.evidence do
VC.Open(D, comIndices[name])→ d;
SH.Store([’decom’, name, comCount[name]], d);
ES.AddComRenew(VC, c,TS);
Algorithm 6: ES.AddComRenew(VC, c,TS)
TS.Stamp((VC, c))→ ts;
l← [(VC, c,TS, ts)];
renewLists← [l];
for name ∈ evidence do
evidence[name] += l;
Secret share renewal There are two types of share renewal supported by ELSA. The first type
(Algorithm 7) triggers the share renewal protocol of the secret sharing system (i.e., the protocol
SHARE.Reshare). This interactive protocol refreshes the shares at the shareholders so that old
shares, which may have leaked already, cannot be combined with the new shares, which are obtained
after the protocol has finished, to reconstruct the stored data. The second type (Algorithm 8)
replaces the proactive sharing scheme entirely. This may be necessary if the scheme has additional
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security properties like verifiability (see proactive verifiable secret sharing [14]), whose security
may be weakened. In this case, the data is retrieved, shared to the new shareholders, and finally
the old shareholders are shutdown.
Algorithm 7: ELSA.RenewShares()
SH.Reshare();
Algorithm 8: ELSA.RenewSharing(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T )
SH′.Init(SHARE, (shURLi)i∈[N ], T );
I ← ES.itemInfos;
for name ∈ I do
SH.Retrieve(’data/’ + name)→ dat;
SH′.Store(’data/’ + name, dat);
SH.Shutdown();
SH← SH′;
Data retrieval The algorithm ELSA.Retrieve (Algorithm 9) describes the data retrieval procedure
of ELSA. It gets as input the name of the data file that is to be retrieved. It then collects the evidence
from the evidence service and the data from the shareholders. Next, the evidence is complemented
with the decommitments and then the algorithm outputs the data with the corresponding evidence.
Algorithm 9: ELSA.Retrieve(name)
e← ES.evidence[name];
for i ∈ [|e|] do
if ei.VC 6= ⊥ then
SH.Retrieve([’decom’, name, i])→ ei.d;
SH.Retrieve([’data’, name])→ (dat, SIG, s);
E ← (SIG, s, e);
return (dat, E);
Verification Algorithm ELSA.Verify (Algorithm 10) describes how a verifier can check the integrity
of a data item using the evidence produced by ELSA. Here we denote by NTT(i, e, tverify) the
time of the next timestamp after entry i of e and by NCT(i, e, tverify) the time of the timestamp
corresponding to the next commitment after entry i, and we set NTT(i, e, tverify) = tverify if i is the
last timestamp and NCT(i, e, tverify) = tverify if i is the last commitment in e. The algorithm gets as
input a reference to the considered PKI (e.g., a trust anchor), the current verification time tverify,
the data to be checked dat, the storage time tstore, and the corresponding evidence E = (SIG, s, e).
The algorithm returns true, if dat is authentic and has been stored at time tstore.
In more detail, the verification algorithm works as follows. It first checks whether the signature
s is valid for the data object dat under signature scheme instance SIG at the time of the first
timestamp of the evidence list e. It also checks whether the corresponding commitment is valid for
(dat,SIG, s) at the time of the next commitment and the timestamp is valid at the next timestamp.
Then, for each of the remaining |e|−1 entries of e, the algorithm checks whether the corresponding
timestamp is valid at the time of the next timestamp and whether the corresponding commitments
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are valid at the time of the next commitments. The algorithm outputs 1 if all checks return valid,
and it outputs 0 in any other case.
Algorithm 10: ELSA.Verify(PKI, tverify : dat, tstore, E)→ b
(SIG, s, e)← E;
((VC, c, d), (VC′, c′, d′), (TS, ts))← e1;
tnt ← NTT(1, e, tverify); tnc ← NCT(1, e, tverify);
b← SIG.Verify(PKI, ts.t : dat, s);
b ∧= VC.Verify(PKI, tnc : (dat, SIG, s), c, d);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c, ts, tstore);
L← (VC, c,TS, ts);
for i ∈ [2, . . . , |e|] do
((VC, c, d), (VC′, c′, d′), (TS, ts))← ei;
tnt ← NTT(i, e, tverify); tnc ← NCT(i, e, tverify);
if VC = ⊥ then
b ∧= VC′.Verify(PKI, tnt : L, c′, d′);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c′, ts, ts.t);
L += (VC′, c′, d′,TS, ts);
else
dat′ ← (dat, Cert, s, e[1, i− 1]);
b ∧= VC.Verify(PKI, tnc : dat′, c, d);
b ∧= TS.Verify(PKI, tnt : c, ts, ts.t);
L← (VC, c,TS, ts);
return b;
4.2 Security analysis
Computational model In a long-running system we have to consider adversaries that increase
their computational power over time. For example, they may increase their computation speed
or acquire new computational devices, such as quantum computers. We capture this by using the
computational model from [6].
A real-time bounded long-lived adversary A is defined as a sequence (A(0),A(1),A(2), . . .) of
machines with A(t) ∈ Mt and is associated with a global clock Clock. We assume that the class
Mt of computing machines available at time t widens when t increases, i.e., Mt ⊆Mt′ for t < t′.
The adversary is given the power to advance the clock, but it cannot go backwards in time. When
AClock is started, then actually the component A(0) is run. Whenever a component A(t) calls the
clock oracle to set a new time t′, then component A(t) is stopped and the component A(t′) is run
with input the internal state of A(t). Real-time computational bounds are expressed as follows. Let
AClock be a computing machine associated with Clock, and let ρ : N→ N be a function. We say A
is ρ-bounded if for every time t, the aggregated step count of the machine components of A until
time t is at most ρ(t).
Integrity First, we analyze integrity protection, by which we mean that it should be infeasible
for an adversary to forge a valid evidence list for a data object, but the data object has not been
authentically signed at the claimed time. This is captured in the following definition, where we
define security with respect to a set of schemes S (e.g., commitment schemes, signature schemes,
timestamp schemes) that are available within the context of the adversary. Also, we assume that
each scheme instance Si is associated with a breakage time tbi after which it is considered insecure.
The experiment (Algorithm 11) has a setup phase, where all the scheme instances are initialized by
means of parameter generation. We write Si.Setup()→ (sk, pk) to denote that a scheme potentially
generates a secret parameter sk (e.g., a private signing key) and a public parameter pk (e.g., a
public verification key or the parameters of a commitment scheme instance). We allow the adversary
to access the secret parameters of an instance once it is considered insecure (via oracle Break).
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Definition 5 (Integrity). We say ELSA is (M, )-unforgeable for schemes S, if for any p-bounded
machine A ∈M,
Pr
[
ExpForgeS (A) = 1
]
≤ (p) .
The experiment ExpForge is described in Algorithm 11.
Algorithm 11: ExpForgeS (A)
SetupExperiment();
AClock,PKI,SIG,TS,Break → (dat, tstore, E);
tverify ← time;
b← Verify(PKI, tverify; dat, tstore, E) ∧ dat 6∈
Qtstore ;
return b;
SetupExperiment():
time← 0;
for i ∈ [|S|] do
Si.Setup→ (sp, pp);
SP [i]← sp; PP [i]← pp;
Clock(t):
if t > time then
time← t;
PKI(i):
return PP [i];
SIG(i,m):
Assert Si.type = sig;
Q[time] += m;
Si.Sign(SP [i];m)→ s;
return s;
TS(i,m):
Assert Si.type = ts;
Sign(i; [time,m])→ s;
return (time, s);
Break(i):
if time ≥ Si.tb then
return SP [i];
Next, we prove that the security of ELSA can be reduced to the extractable binding security of
the used commitment schemes and the unforgeability of the used signature schemes within their
validity period.
Theorem 6. Let M = (Mt)t specify which computational technology is available at which point
in time and let S be a set of cryptographic schemes, where each scheme Si ∈ S is associated with
a breakage time tbi and is i-secure against adversaries using computational technology Mtbi . In
particular, we require unforgeability-security for signature schemes and extractable-binding-security
for commitment schemes. Let pE be any computational bound and L be an upper bound on the
maximum vector length of the commitment schemes in S. Then, ELSA is (M, )-unforgeable for S
with (p) = (
∑
i∈SIG i(p(t
b
i )pE(t
b
i )L
2)) + (
∑
i∈COM i(p(t
b
i ), pE(t
b
i ), p(t
b
i ))).
Proof (Proof of Theorem 6). Suppose any p-bounded machine A that interacts with interfaces
Clock, PKI, SIG, and TS, and outputs (dat, tstore, E). For each signature scheme i ∈ SIG, construct a
machine Bi with the goal to break the unforgeability of scheme i until time tbi . Bi in the signature
unforgeability experiment gets as input a public key pk and access to a signing oracle Sign. Its goal
is to output (m, s) such that Si.Verify(pk,m, s) = 1 and the oracle Sign was not queried with m.
Bi, on input pk, does the following. It runs A until time tbi and simulates the environment of A
with the following difference. Bi sets the public key of signature scheme i to pk and whenever the
simulation of the experiment for A requires the generation of a signature for scheme i, Bi requests
the signature from the oracle Sign. While A is running, Bi searches the outputs of A for a valid
message-signature-pair, where the message has not been queried to the signing oracle thus far. Bi
also uses the extractable-binding property of the commitment schemes, as follows. Whenever, A
queries the timestamp service TS with a commitment, then Bi uses a pE-bounded commitment
message extractor to extract the corresponding messages out of A. Let L be an upper bound on
the maximum length supported by all the used vector commitment schemes COM. Then, Bi runs
in at most pBi = p(t
b
i ) ∗ pE(tbi ) ∗ L2 operations and adheres to the computational model Mtbi .
We observe that an evidence object E is a sequence (SIG, s, CDT1, . . . , CDTn), where CDTi =
(VCi, ci, di,VC
′
i, c
′
i, d
′
i,TSi, tsi). Define CTi = (VC
′
i, c
′
i, d
′
i,TSi, tsi). The verification algorithm of
ELSA ensures that tsi is a valid timestamp for (VCj , cj , CTj , . . . , CTi−1), where j is the largest in-
dex such that VCj 6= ⊥ and j ≤ i. If VCj 6= ⊥, then it also ensures that di is a valid opening of ci to
(dat,SIG, s, CDT1, . . . , CDTi−1). It follows that in every run in which A outputs (dat, tstore, E) with
Verify(PKI, tverify; dat, tstore, E) = 1 and dat 6∈ Qtstore , there is at least one Bi that wins its unforgeabil-
ity experiment before time tbi or at least one of the extractors used by Bi fails. Hence, the probability
that A breaks ELSA is upper bounded by (∑i∈SIG i(pBi))+(∑i∈COM i(p(tbi ), pE(tbi ), p(tbi ))), where
COM denotes the set of commitment schemes and SIG denotes the set of signature schemes of S.
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Confidentiality Next, we analyze confidentiality protection of ELSA. Intuitively, we require that
an adversary with unbounded computational power who observes the data that is received by the
evidence service and a subset of the shareholders does not learn any substantial information about
the stored data. In particular, it should be guaranteed that an adversary does not learn anything
about unopened files even if it retrieves some of the other files and the corresponding signatures,
commitments, and timestamps.
We model this intuition by requiring that any (unbounded) adversary A should not be able to
distinguish whether it interacts with a system that stores a file vector F1 or a system that stores
another file vector F2, if A only opens a subset I of files and F1 and F2 are identical on I. This is
modeled in experiment ExpDIST (Algorithm 12), where we use the following notation. For a secret
sharing scheme SHARE we denote by SHARE.AS the set of authorized shareholder subsets that
can reconstruct the secret. For a protocol P, we write 〈P〉View to denote an execution of P where
View contains all the data sent and received by the involved parties. For an involved party P, we
write View(P) to denote the data sent and received by party P.
Definition 6 (Confidentiality). We say ELSA is -statistically-hiding for S, if for all machines
A, subsets I, sets of files F1, F2 with (F1)I = (F2)I , for all L ∈ N,∣∣∣Pr [ExpDistS,L(A, F1, I) = 1]− Pr [ExpDistS,L(A, F2, I) = 1]∣∣∣ ≤ (L) .
The experiment ExpDIST is described in Algorithm 12.
Algorithm 12: ExpDistS,L(A, F iles, I)
SetupExperiment();
AClock,ELSA′ → b;
return b;
SetupExperiment():
time← 0; N ← 0;
Generate parameters for S;
ELSA.Init(S.SHARE,SH,ES);
Clock(t):
if t > time then
time← t;
ELSA′(op, param):
if N < L then
N += 1; T ← T ′;
if op = Store ∧ param 6∈ S.SHARE.AS then
〈ELSA.Store(Files, param)〉View; T ← param;
else if op = Retrieve ∧ param ∈ I then
〈ELSA.Retrieve(param)〉View;
else if op = ReTs then
〈ELSA.RenewTs(param)〉View;
else if op = ReCom then
〈ELSA.RenewCom(param)〉View;
else if op = ReShare ∧ param 6∈ S.SHARE.AS then
〈ELSA.RenewShares()〉View; T ′ ← param;
return View(ES,SHT , Receiver);
Next, we show that ELSA indeed provides confidentiality protection as defined above if statis-
tically hiding secret sharing and commitment schemes are used.
Theorem 7. Let S be a set of schemes, where S.SHARE is an -statistically-hiding secret sharing
scheme and every commitment scheme in S is -statistically-hiding. Then, ELSA is ′-statistically-
hiding for S with ′(L) = 2L.
Proof (Proof of Theorem 7). We observe that the statistical distance between the view of the
evidence service and the receiver for F1 and the view for F2 is at most  per call to ELSA
′ because
the vector commitment schemes in S are -statistically-hiding. The statistical distance between
the view of an unauthorized subset of shareholders for F1 and the view of the same subset of
shareholders for F2 is also at most  because the secret sharing scheme is -statistically-hiding. It
follows that the statistical distance for each query of the adversary diverges by at most 2. Hence,
overall the statistical distance is bounded by 2L.
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With regards to protecting the network communication between the data owner and the share-
holders we ideally require that information theoretically channels are used (e.g., based on Quan-
tum Key Distribution and One-Time-Pad Encryption [10]), so that a network provider, who could
potentially intercept all of the secret share packages, cannot learn any information about the com-
municated data. If information theoretically secure channels are not available, we recommend to
use very strong symmetric encryption (e.g., AES-256 [19]).
5 Performance evaluation
We compare the performance of our new architecture ELSA with the performance of the storage
architecture LINCOS [3], which is the fastest existing storage architecture that provides long-term
integrity and long-term confidentiality.
5.1 Evaluation scenario
For our evaluation we consider a scenario inspired by the task of securely storing electronic health
records in a medium sized doctor’s office. The storage time frame is 100 years. Every month, 10 new
data items of size 10 kB (e.g., prescription data of patients) are added. Every year, one document
from each of the previous years is retrieved and verified (e.g., historic prescription data is read
from the archives).
We assume the following renewal schedule for protecting the evidence against the weakening of
cryptographic primitives. The signatures are renewed every 2 years, as this is a typical lifetime of
a public key certificate, which is needed to verify the signatures. While signature scheme instances
can only be secure as long as the corresponding private signing key is not leaked to an adversary,
commitment scheme instances do not involve the usage of any secret parameters. Therefore, their
security is not threatened by key leakage and we assume that they only need to be renewed every
10 years in order to adjust the cryptographic parameter sizes or to choose a new and more secure
scheme.
In our architecture we instantiate signature and commitment schemes as follows. As signature
scheme, we first use the RSA Signature Scheme [21] and then switch to the post-quantum secure
XMSS signature scheme [5] by 2030, as we anticipate the development of large-scale quantum
computers. Both of these schemes satisfy unforgeability security as required by Theorem 6. As
the vector commitment scheme we use Construction 2 with the statistically hiding commitment
scheme by Halevi and Micali [13] whose security is based on the security of the used hash function
which we instantiate with members of the SHA-2 hash function family [20]. If we model hash
functions as random oracles, the extractable-binding property required by Theorem 6 is provided.
This vector commitment scheme construction also provides statistical hiding security as required
by Theorem 7. We adjust the signature and commitment scheme parameters over time as proposed
by Lenstra and Verheul [17,16]. The resulting parameter sets are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. Overview of the used commitment and signature scheme instances and their usage period.
Years Signatures Commitments
2018-2030 RSA-2048 HM-256
2031-2090 XMSS-256 HM-256
2091-2118 XMSS-512 HM-512
For the storage system, we use the secret sharing scheme by Shamir [22]. We run this scheme
with 4 shareholders and a threshold of 3 shareholders are required for reconstruction. Secret shares
are renewed every 5 years, where the resharing is carried out centrally by the data owner.
5.2 Results
We now present the results of our performance analysis. Figure 2 compares the computation time
and storage costs of the two systems, ELSA and LINCOS. Our implementation was done using the
16
programming language Java. The experiments were performed on a computer with a quad-core
AMD Opteron CPU running at 2.3 GHz and the Java virtual machine was assigned 32 GB of RAM.
We observe that ELSA is much more computationally efficient compared to LINCOS. Completing
the experiment using LINCOS took approximately 6.81 h, while it took only 24 min using ELSA.
The biggest difference in the timings is observed when renewing timestamps. Timestamp renewal
with LINCOS for year 2116 takes 21.89 min, while it takes only 0.34 s with ELSA. Data storage
performance is also considerably faster with ELSA than with LINCOS. The same holds for the
commitment renewal procedure. Data retrieval and verification performance is similar for the two
systems.
Next, we observe that ELSA is also more efficient compared to LINCOS when it comes to
the consumed storage space at the evidence service. This is, again, because ELSA requires fewer
timestamps to be generated and stored than LINCOS. After running for 100 years, the evidence
service of ELSA consumes only 17.27 MB while the evidence service of LINCOS consumes 1.75 GB
of storage space. We observe by Figure 2 that ELSA consumes slightly more storage space at the
shareholders than LINCOS. This is because additional decommitment information for the vector
commitments must be stored. After running for 100 years, a shareholder of ELSA consumes about
748 MB while a shareholder of LINCOS consumes about 559 MB of storage space.
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Fig. 2. Running time of the experiment and storage space consumption of the evidence service and per
shareholder.
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